Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin Sys. v. Phoenix Intl. Software, Inc., No 08-4161 (7th Cir 2011)
Phoenix brought a cancellation action with the TTAB claiming that UW's CONDOR mark should be canceled based upon likelihood of confusion with its own CONDOR mark. (See 15 U.S.C. 1064 and 1052(d)) Phoenix had registered its CONDOR mark four years before UW.
Phoenix's goods were for "computer software for on-line programming development, library management and system utilities functioning on mainframe systems."
UW's mark was for a "computer network operating system software, downloadable from a global computer network, that delivers large amounts of computational power by utilizing idle computing resources in a network of individual computer workstations..."
The TTAB canceled UW's mark on the likelihood of confusion grounds and more specifically that: the marks were identical; the software products of both parties were similar in function, (Phoenix presented testimony before the TTAB that its software could be used outside of a mainframe), and that skilled consumers would likely have thought the two products originated from the same source, (the TTAB noted that Phoenix had spent a sizable amount of money marketing its product and presented at trade shows while UW testified that it planned to expand).
After losing in the TTAB, UW filed an action in federal district court rather than appealing to the Federal Circuit seeking to reverse the cancellation. Phoenix brought counterclaims against UW for trademark infringement and false designation. Focusing on the descriptions of the products in the trademark registrations, the district court found that the TTAB erred by considering the actual nature of the software products and misapplied the burden of proof in the case. The district court reversed the TTAB. On appeal, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case back to the district court for trial.
The proper issue was not whether the software products performed the same functions but whether a consumer (or a sophisticated consumer) who would use both products would think that they came from the same source. CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Engineering, Inc., 267 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2001)
The 7th Circuit uses a 7-factor test for determining likelihood of confusion: 1) the similarity of the marks in appearance and suggestion, 2) similarity of the products, 3) The area and manner of concurrent use, 4) Degree of care likely to be used by a consumer, 5) strength of plaintiff's mark, 6) evidence of actual confusion, and 7) whether the defendant intended to "palm off" its product as that of the plaintiff. Citing AutoZone, Inc. v. Strick, 543 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2008); In re E.I. DuPont, 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973) The court went on to say that "[t]he rights of an owner of a registered trademark extend to any goods or services that, in the minds of consumers, might be put out by a single producer. Thus, a likelihood of confusion may exist even if the parties are not in direct competition, or their products and services are not identical." Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. at 17 The panel also admitted that it may place more weight on whether the marks are similar or identical because such a question is one of fact. Id. at 19 referencing M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Comm., Inc. 450 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
The panel found that the TTAB analysis comported with its own analysis: The marks were identical, the products performed in a similar fashion and that sophisticated consumers would equate the two products as being from the same source.
The appellate panel then proceeded to dismiss Phoenix's counterclaims for trademark infringement based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity which is granted to state entities under the 11th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The only way that state sovereign immunity can be overcome is (1) Congress provides for abrogation pursuant to the 14th amendment, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), or (2) the state affirmatively waives sovereign immunity, see Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883).
The 7th circuit acknowledged that the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA) was held unconstitutional in Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 666 (1999) as to providing state liability for false advertising. The 7th Circuit acknowledged that the SCOTUS's decision as it might be applied to an infringement counterclaim was unclear.
The 7th Circuit equated Phoenix's claims to the TRCA's sister statute, the Patent Remedy Clarification Act (PRCA), which allowed for states to be held liable for patent infringement and had likewise been held unconstitutional. First the panel looked to see if the TRCA was "appropriate" under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment. The 7th circuit found that the TRCA was not congruent and proportional to the unlawful acts it sought to prohibit. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) This had also been the case with the PRCA. The court agreed with UW that Congress had not much evidence of state induced trademark infringement and that any such infringement was not a taking of property without due process because Congress had not considered the availability of state remedies. Bd. of Regents at 29 citing Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) For purposes of the case, the patent version of Florida Prepaid and Board of Regents were basically interchangeable when it came to the abrogation issue.
Next, the court looked to see if UW had waived its sovereign immunity by engaging in a TTAB cancellation proceeding and participating in the federal trademark registration system. In sum, did UW commit a constructive waiver. The answer to this question was a resounding no. More specifically, constructive waiver had been rejected in the Florida Prepaid case. Bd. of Regents at 33 The court also noted that Phoenix's counterclaims were not dependent upon UW's trademark registration and the district court action was really just a continuation of the cancellation proceeding. Id at 33-35
Because there had no valid congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity via Section 5 of the 14th Amendment for trademark infringement counterclaims, and because UW had not waived its immunity, summary judgment for UW on the counterclaims based on sovereign immunity was affirmed.
Circuit Judge Wood concurred with the majority's findings on the likelihood of confusion issue but did not agree that UW could claim protection of sovereign immunity.
No comments:
Post a Comment