Showing posts with label likelihood of confusion. Show all posts
Showing posts with label likelihood of confusion. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 24, 2012

Proving Your Identity and How the Media Has Mangled The Beyonce Trademark Story Worse Than “Dewey Defeats Truman”


By now, most have read the onslaught of stories from news sources, blogs and entertainment sites about how Beyonce and Jay-Z have “lost” their battle to obtain a federal trademark registration on their newly born daughter’s name:  BLUE IVY CARTER.  The reporting on this story has ranged from bizarre to downright ridiculous. The truth though is that their trademark application is still pending.  Only Harry Truman, who held up that famous Chicago Tribune misprint in 1948 would appreciate the level of misinformation about trademark law now being pumped out into the public with this story.

Yet, there is another facet to this story that provides some lessons on something that seems to happen when celebrities file trademark applications on their names.  According to USPTO records, part of the problem with the BLUE IVY CARTER application involved the baby’s identity.  The trademark examiner issued a refusal pursuant to Section 2(a) and 2(c) of the Lanham Act.  The essence was that the USPTO needed both verification and permission in order to proceed with any possible registration.

Let’s start with Section 2(a) (15 U.S.C. 1052(a)).   The Lanham Act tells us that marks falsely suggesting a connection with a person, institution, belief or national symbol cannot be registered.  The trademark examining attorney argued that the BLUE IVY CARTER application, signed by Beyonce, falsely suggested a connection to Blue Ivy Carter.

Section 2(a), according to case law and the TMEP, acts to protect one’s identity from unauthorized use.  As set forth in TMEP 1203.03(e), four elements must be met under Section 2(a) to trigger a refusal: 

1.     The mark is the same, or a close approximation, the name or identity previously used by another person or institution;
2.     The mark would be recognized as such, in that it points uniquely and unmistakably to that person or institution;
3.     The person or institution named by the mark is not connected with the activities performed by the applicant under the mark; and,
4.     The fame or reputation of the person or institution is such that, when the mark is used with the applicant’s goods or services, a connection with the person or institution would be presumed.

The examining attorney found that all four elements were met.  The celebrity of Beyonce’s and Jay-Z’s daughter would cause consumers to believe that there was a connection with the proposed products and Blue Ivy (and her parents) and that Blue Ivy herself was not, from the record, connected to the activities performed under the mark. 

The examining attorney indicated that Beyonce would have to submit a declaration identifying her relationship to Blue Ivy to overcome this 2(a) refusal.

The next refusal was based on Section 2(c) of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. 1052(c)).  Here, the examining attorney noted that Blue Ivy had not given consent for her name to be registered.  The Act requires that when a mark “consists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular living individual,” written consent is required to proceed with registration.  The purpose of this rule is to protect a person’s privacy rights.  See TMEP 1206.

The key to 2(c) is that the person must be someone that the “public would recognize and understand the mark as identifying a particular living individual.”  See TMEP 1206.  Here, Blue Ivy was not just a living person, but a famous one by way of her parents and swirling media stories surrounding her birth.  The examining attorney indicated that to overcome the 2(c) refusal, a declaration identifying Blue Ivy as a living individual and granting consent to use her name would have to be submitted.  Because Blue Ivy is a minor, this statement would have to conform to state law requirements allowing Beyonce to act on her child’s behalf.

If 2(c) sounds familiar to entertainment, political and law junkies, this was the same problem that Sarah Palin and her daughter Bristol encountered when they filed trademark applications on their names.   Each was required by the USPTO to submit written consent for their names to be registered after a first office action refusal.

What we can see from these cases is that famous people trying to trademark their names need to provide the USPTO with written consent verifying their identity; basically giving themselves permission to register their own names.

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So let’s now take a quick look as to how the news and entertainment outlets have created a fire where one never existed.  Beyonce filed her intent-to-use trademark application listing a huge variety of goods and services spread out over 15 classifications of goods and services.  The USPTO issued likelihood of confusion (15 U.S.C. 1052(d)) refusals for three of those classes (Class 03, 014 and 025).   The others were untouched.

Registration was refused under Section 2(d) for goods and services under class 014 and 025 because of the BLUE IVY registration belonging to a Massachusetts wedding and event planning business.  According to the USPTO online system, Beyonce’s attorney amended her application simply deleting the goods and services in classes 014 and 025 from the application.

The second cited mark, which triggered the refusal for class 003, was a squatter who filed their application within day’s of Blue Ivy’s birth.  The squatter’s application was co-pending with Beyonce’s application and was awaiting disposition of an office action.  The USPTO refused registration on the squatter’s application under 2(a) and 2(c) of the Lanham Act for its open association with Blue Ivy Carter.  Beyonce’s attorney further petitioned the USPTO to suspend examination on BLUE IVY CARTER until examination on the squatter’s application was complete.  The USPTO issued a suspension letter and also withdrew the earlier grounds for refusal, including the likelihood of confusion refusal with the Massachusetts BLUE IVY company.  Eventually, the squatter’s application became abandoned when the applicant failed to respond to the 2(a)/2(c) refusal.  The squatter wouldn’t have been able to overcome the refusal as the USPTO asked for the same sorts of identity verifications as it had asked Beyonce. 

With the path now clear to apparent approval and publication of the BLUE IVY CARTER trademark application, Beyonce’s attorneys have filed a request that the examination suspension be lifted.

The media, including such outlets as CNN, Rolling Stone and Huffington Post, have egg all over their face on this and its sad that they have done much to disseminate totally inaccurate information about how the trademark registration process works.  (One source even said a judge made a ruling on the trademark application – which is as accurate as saying cats can fly). 


Wednesday, January 19, 2011

7th Circuit Addresses 11th Amendment State Sovereign Immunity For Trademark Cases

Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin Sys. v. Phoenix Intl. Software, Inc., No 08-4161 (7th Cir 2011)

Phoenix brought a cancellation action with the TTAB claiming that UW's CONDOR mark should be canceled based upon likelihood of confusion with its own CONDOR mark. (See 15 U.S.C. 1064 and 1052(d)) Phoenix had registered its CONDOR mark four years before UW.

Phoenix's goods were for "computer software for on-line programming development, library management and system utilities functioning on mainframe systems."

UW's mark was for a "computer network operating system software, downloadable from a global computer network, that delivers large amounts of computational power by utilizing idle computing resources in a network of individual computer workstations..."

The TTAB canceled UW's mark on the likelihood of confusion grounds and more specifically that: the marks were identical; the software products of both parties were similar in function, (Phoenix presented testimony before the TTAB that its software could be used outside of a mainframe), and that skilled consumers would likely have thought the two products originated from the same source, (the TTAB noted that Phoenix had spent a sizable amount of money marketing its product and presented at trade shows while UW testified that it planned to expand).

After losing in the TTAB, UW filed an action in federal district court rather than appealing to the Federal Circuit seeking to reverse the cancellation. Phoenix brought counterclaims against UW for trademark infringement and false designation. Focusing on the descriptions of the products in the trademark registrations, the district court found that the TTAB erred by considering the actual nature of the software products and misapplied the burden of proof in the case. The district court reversed the TTAB. On appeal, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case back to the district court for trial.

The proper issue was not whether the software products performed the same functions but whether a consumer (or a sophisticated consumer) who would use both products would think that they came from the same source. CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Engineering, Inc., 267 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2001)

The 7th Circuit uses a 7-factor test for determining likelihood of confusion: 1) the similarity of the marks in appearance and suggestion, 2) similarity of the products, 3) The area and manner of concurrent use, 4) Degree of care likely to be used by a consumer, 5) strength of plaintiff's mark, 6) evidence of actual confusion, and 7) whether the defendant intended to "palm off" its product as that of the plaintiff. Citing AutoZone, Inc. v. Strick, 543 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2008); In re E.I. DuPont, 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973) The court went on to say that "[t]he rights of an owner of a registered trademark extend to any goods or services that, in the minds of consumers, might be put out by a single producer. Thus, a likelihood of confusion may exist even if the parties are not in direct competition, or their products and services are not identical." Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. at 17 The panel also admitted that it may place more weight on whether the marks are similar or identical because such a question is one of fact. Id. at 19 referencing M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Comm., Inc. 450 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006)

The panel found that the TTAB analysis comported with its own analysis: The marks were identical, the products performed in a similar fashion and that sophisticated consumers would equate the two products as being from the same source.

The appellate panel then proceeded to dismiss Phoenix's counterclaims for trademark infringement based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity which is granted to state entities under the 11th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The only way that state sovereign immunity can be overcome is (1) Congress provides for abrogation pursuant to the 14th amendment, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), or (2) the state affirmatively waives sovereign immunity, see Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883).

The 7th circuit acknowledged that the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA) was held unconstitutional in Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 666 (1999) as to providing state liability for false advertising. The 7th Circuit acknowledged that the SCOTUS's decision as it might be applied to an infringement counterclaim was unclear.

The 7th Circuit equated Phoenix's claims to the TRCA's sister statute, the Patent Remedy Clarification Act (PRCA), which allowed for states to be held liable for patent infringement and had likewise been held unconstitutional. First the panel looked to see if the TRCA was "appropriate" under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment. The 7th circuit found that the TRCA was not congruent and proportional to the unlawful acts it sought to prohibit. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) This had also been the case with the PRCA. The court agreed with UW that Congress had not much evidence of state induced trademark infringement and that any such infringement was not a taking of property without due process because Congress had not considered the availability of state remedies. Bd. of Regents at 29 citing Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) For purposes of the case, the patent version of Florida Prepaid and Board of Regents were basically interchangeable when it came to the abrogation issue.

Next, the court looked to see if UW had waived its sovereign immunity by engaging in a TTAB cancellation proceeding and participating in the federal trademark registration system. In sum, did UW commit a constructive waiver. The answer to this question was a resounding no. More specifically, constructive waiver had been rejected in the Florida Prepaid case. Bd. of Regents at 33 The court also noted that Phoenix's counterclaims were not dependent upon UW's trademark registration and the district court action was really just a continuation of the cancellation proceeding. Id at 33-35

Because there had no valid congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity via Section 5 of the 14th Amendment for trademark infringement counterclaims, and because UW had not waived its immunity, summary judgment for UW on the counterclaims based on sovereign immunity was affirmed.

Circuit Judge Wood concurred with the majority's findings on the likelihood of confusion issue but did not agree that UW could claim protection of sovereign immunity.