Wednesday, October 24, 2012

Proving Your Identity and How the Media Has Mangled The Beyonce Trademark Story Worse Than “Dewey Defeats Truman”


By now, most have read the onslaught of stories from news sources, blogs and entertainment sites about how Beyonce and Jay-Z have “lost” their battle to obtain a federal trademark registration on their newly born daughter’s name:  BLUE IVY CARTER.  The reporting on this story has ranged from bizarre to downright ridiculous. The truth though is that their trademark application is still pending.  Only Harry Truman, who held up that famous Chicago Tribune misprint in 1948 would appreciate the level of misinformation about trademark law now being pumped out into the public with this story.

Yet, there is another facet to this story that provides some lessons on something that seems to happen when celebrities file trademark applications on their names.  According to USPTO records, part of the problem with the BLUE IVY CARTER application involved the baby’s identity.  The trademark examiner issued a refusal pursuant to Section 2(a) and 2(c) of the Lanham Act.  The essence was that the USPTO needed both verification and permission in order to proceed with any possible registration.

Let’s start with Section 2(a) (15 U.S.C. 1052(a)).   The Lanham Act tells us that marks falsely suggesting a connection with a person, institution, belief or national symbol cannot be registered.  The trademark examining attorney argued that the BLUE IVY CARTER application, signed by Beyonce, falsely suggested a connection to Blue Ivy Carter.

Section 2(a), according to case law and the TMEP, acts to protect one’s identity from unauthorized use.  As set forth in TMEP 1203.03(e), four elements must be met under Section 2(a) to trigger a refusal: 

1.     The mark is the same, or a close approximation, the name or identity previously used by another person or institution;
2.     The mark would be recognized as such, in that it points uniquely and unmistakably to that person or institution;
3.     The person or institution named by the mark is not connected with the activities performed by the applicant under the mark; and,
4.     The fame or reputation of the person or institution is such that, when the mark is used with the applicant’s goods or services, a connection with the person or institution would be presumed.

The examining attorney found that all four elements were met.  The celebrity of Beyonce’s and Jay-Z’s daughter would cause consumers to believe that there was a connection with the proposed products and Blue Ivy (and her parents) and that Blue Ivy herself was not, from the record, connected to the activities performed under the mark. 

The examining attorney indicated that Beyonce would have to submit a declaration identifying her relationship to Blue Ivy to overcome this 2(a) refusal.

The next refusal was based on Section 2(c) of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. 1052(c)).  Here, the examining attorney noted that Blue Ivy had not given consent for her name to be registered.  The Act requires that when a mark “consists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular living individual,” written consent is required to proceed with registration.  The purpose of this rule is to protect a person’s privacy rights.  See TMEP 1206.

The key to 2(c) is that the person must be someone that the “public would recognize and understand the mark as identifying a particular living individual.”  See TMEP 1206.  Here, Blue Ivy was not just a living person, but a famous one by way of her parents and swirling media stories surrounding her birth.  The examining attorney indicated that to overcome the 2(c) refusal, a declaration identifying Blue Ivy as a living individual and granting consent to use her name would have to be submitted.  Because Blue Ivy is a minor, this statement would have to conform to state law requirements allowing Beyonce to act on her child’s behalf.

If 2(c) sounds familiar to entertainment, political and law junkies, this was the same problem that Sarah Palin and her daughter Bristol encountered when they filed trademark applications on their names.   Each was required by the USPTO to submit written consent for their names to be registered after a first office action refusal.

What we can see from these cases is that famous people trying to trademark their names need to provide the USPTO with written consent verifying their identity; basically giving themselves permission to register their own names.

                                                            *          *          *

So let’s now take a quick look as to how the news and entertainment outlets have created a fire where one never existed.  Beyonce filed her intent-to-use trademark application listing a huge variety of goods and services spread out over 15 classifications of goods and services.  The USPTO issued likelihood of confusion (15 U.S.C. 1052(d)) refusals for three of those classes (Class 03, 014 and 025).   The others were untouched.

Registration was refused under Section 2(d) for goods and services under class 014 and 025 because of the BLUE IVY registration belonging to a Massachusetts wedding and event planning business.  According to the USPTO online system, Beyonce’s attorney amended her application simply deleting the goods and services in classes 014 and 025 from the application.

The second cited mark, which triggered the refusal for class 003, was a squatter who filed their application within day’s of Blue Ivy’s birth.  The squatter’s application was co-pending with Beyonce’s application and was awaiting disposition of an office action.  The USPTO refused registration on the squatter’s application under 2(a) and 2(c) of the Lanham Act for its open association with Blue Ivy Carter.  Beyonce’s attorney further petitioned the USPTO to suspend examination on BLUE IVY CARTER until examination on the squatter’s application was complete.  The USPTO issued a suspension letter and also withdrew the earlier grounds for refusal, including the likelihood of confusion refusal with the Massachusetts BLUE IVY company.  Eventually, the squatter’s application became abandoned when the applicant failed to respond to the 2(a)/2(c) refusal.  The squatter wouldn’t have been able to overcome the refusal as the USPTO asked for the same sorts of identity verifications as it had asked Beyonce. 

With the path now clear to apparent approval and publication of the BLUE IVY CARTER trademark application, Beyonce’s attorneys have filed a request that the examination suspension be lifted.

The media, including such outlets as CNN, Rolling Stone and Huffington Post, have egg all over their face on this and its sad that they have done much to disseminate totally inaccurate information about how the trademark registration process works.  (One source even said a judge made a ruling on the trademark application – which is as accurate as saying cats can fly). 


Tuesday, February 21, 2012

Entrepreneurs Beware: The NY Times Looks At A Trademark Opposition

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/business/battle-over-pretzel-crisps-shows-value-of-a-brand.html?_r=1&src=me&ref=business


This story should serve as an important lesson to small businesses and entrepreneurs; the trademark registration process is not always as simple as it might appear.  Much legal thought and strategy goes into the legwork leading up to the filing of an application such as performing searches of registered, common-law marks and business filings.  The proper international classes of goods/services must be selected, legal questions as to the possible strength of the proposed mark need to be addressed, a suitable goods/services description needs to be drafted and responding to office actions take time, research and reasoning on the part of an attorney.  Evaluating a proposed mark and prosecuting the application for registration in the USPTO is not a matter to be taken lightly.  Working with an attorney before and during the trademark prosecution process can wind up saving blood, sweat, tears and money in the long run.

Wednesday, September 21, 2011

Freelancing, Copyright and "Work-For-Hire"

Freelancing is a popular way of making money, both as a primary and secondary source of income.  Whether one is an artist, graphic designer, writer, or computer programmer, it can provide opportunities to build experience and develop skills as well as grow your network.  Freelancing has pitfalls too.  One sticky area that those on both sides of the freelancing relationship overlook are the legal consequences, and more specifically, copyright ownership and the need for a well-drafted contract.

A common term thrown around in freelancing is “work-made-for-hire.”  In a literal sense, this is the very nature of freelancing.  A client hires, and pays, someone to perform work for a particular project.  It’s fairly straightforward.  Yet, under the Copyright Act,  “work-for-hire” has a different meaning and it can have important consequences for freelancers.

The Supreme Court spelled it out in Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989), which dealt with an ownership dispute over a sculptural work.  To start, the Court said “the author is the party that actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression…”  Reid at 737  However, in a work-for-hire relationship, “’the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author’ and owns the copyright unless there is a written agreement to the contrary.”  Id.   

The Copyright Act sets out specifically what types of works qualify as work-for-hire:  They are:  (1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a

*contribution to a collective work,
*as part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
*as a translation,
*as a supplementary work,
*as a compilation,
*as an instructional text,
*as a test,
*as written material for a test,
*or as an atlas,

For a specially ordered or commissioned work, the parties must also agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be deemed a work made for-hire.  See 17 U.S.C. 101 (Copyright Act of 1976)

If the project falls under one of the nine categories, it may be a work for hire depending on the terms of the freelancer’s contract.  In the Reid case, the sculpture did not fall into one of these nine categories even though Reid was working as an independent contractor.  The result was that the artist retained an ownership interest in the sculpture’s copyright.

It is important that freelancers, regardless of their fields of expertise, have written contracts in place with their clients before starting a project and that the contract address issues of copyright ownership.  Depending on the type of work one is doing as a freelancer, a “work-for-hire” clause may not have the desired legal effect of transferring ownership when the project is completed.   In the end, the artist might be left with a bundle of rights and the client with an egg shell!



*The information contained in this article does not constitute legal advice nor should it be construed as creating an attorney-client relationship.  The contents of this article are solely for educational purposes.  Persons should consult with an attorney before relying upon any information.

Wednesday, August 31, 2011

"Naked Consent" Agreement Shot Down By TTAB

One way some trademark applicants attempt to overcome a likelihood of confusion refusal from the USPTO is to enter into an agreement with the owner of the previously registered mark that there is no likelihood of confusion.  Guidelines concerning the use of consent agreements can be found at TMEP Section 1207.01(d)(viii).  The agreement should set forth in detail why there would be no likelihood of confusion between the registered mark and the applicant's mark and what steps are being taken to avoid consumer confusion.  Such was not the case in a recent TTAB opinion In re Intuity Medical, Inc. 77416484 (2011 Not Precidential)

The applicant sought to register the standard character mark ONE STEP and ONE-STEP for blood glucose monitoring systems.  The examining attorney refused registration based on likelihood of confusion with three registered marks owned by the same entity.  The examiner, applying the DuPont* factors, first determined that the applicant's mark and the registered marks were for all practical purposes identical in sound, appearance and connotation.  Next, the examiner found that the products associated with the applicant's mark and the registered marks, blood glucose monitoring systems and their components, were related, moved in the same channels of trade and sold to the same class of consumers.

Facing an uphill battle at this point, the applicant's hopes lay with a consent to register agreement which had been made with the owner of the registered marks.  Here is where things went very, very wrong.  The agreement stated that the registrant was giving the applicant permission to:

"use and obtain registration in the United States and internationally of its ONE STEP and ONE-STEP marks in connection with the following goods:  blood glucose monitoring systems including the devices, and parts and accessories thereof in Class 10."

On appeal to the TTAB, the board found that this agreement failed to overcome the likelihood of confusion refusal because it did not provide any reasons as to why the parties felt that there was an absence of a likelihood of confusion nor did the agreement address any steps taken by the parties to avoid confusion in the marketplace.  The boards conclusion was that the agreement was mere "naked consent" and insufficient.

Another major mistake the applicant made was citing confidentiality as a reason why a more detailed copy of the agreement could not be submitted to the examiner after such detail was requested.  The TTAB would not go along with this.  One curiosity of the opinion, I thought, was that the TTAB said the applicant could have submitted a redacted copy of the full consent agreement to the examining attorney. The value of such a heavily redacted document, which might have provided little to no detail on the content requirements, seems questionable.

The take-away lessons from this case are:  (1)  follow the TMEP 1207.01(d)(viii) guidelines when working with a consent to register agreement.  Put in details that might demonstrate a lack of likelihood of confusion to the USPTO examining attorneys.  Also consider inserting clauses describing any agreements on usage or other restrictions with the registrant.  Lastly, redacted copies and confidentiality issues concerning these types of agreements may come back to bite an applicant later in the trademark prosecution process.  The agreement is a tool to show the USPTO why your mark should be registered.  Making relevant information un-viewable or un-available to the examiners could result in your agreement worthless.

*In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (CCPA 1973)

Tuesday, March 22, 2011

Hollywood and Trademarks Team Up For "The Win!"

The recent events between CBS and Charlie Sheen have sparked a trademark filing frenzy at the USPTO involving Mr. Sheen's very popular catchphrase.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42137288/ns/business-us_business/

Wednesday, January 19, 2011

7th Circuit Addresses 11th Amendment State Sovereign Immunity For Trademark Cases

Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin Sys. v. Phoenix Intl. Software, Inc., No 08-4161 (7th Cir 2011)

Phoenix brought a cancellation action with the TTAB claiming that UW's CONDOR mark should be canceled based upon likelihood of confusion with its own CONDOR mark. (See 15 U.S.C. 1064 and 1052(d)) Phoenix had registered its CONDOR mark four years before UW.

Phoenix's goods were for "computer software for on-line programming development, library management and system utilities functioning on mainframe systems."

UW's mark was for a "computer network operating system software, downloadable from a global computer network, that delivers large amounts of computational power by utilizing idle computing resources in a network of individual computer workstations..."

The TTAB canceled UW's mark on the likelihood of confusion grounds and more specifically that: the marks were identical; the software products of both parties were similar in function, (Phoenix presented testimony before the TTAB that its software could be used outside of a mainframe), and that skilled consumers would likely have thought the two products originated from the same source, (the TTAB noted that Phoenix had spent a sizable amount of money marketing its product and presented at trade shows while UW testified that it planned to expand).

After losing in the TTAB, UW filed an action in federal district court rather than appealing to the Federal Circuit seeking to reverse the cancellation. Phoenix brought counterclaims against UW for trademark infringement and false designation. Focusing on the descriptions of the products in the trademark registrations, the district court found that the TTAB erred by considering the actual nature of the software products and misapplied the burden of proof in the case. The district court reversed the TTAB. On appeal, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case back to the district court for trial.

The proper issue was not whether the software products performed the same functions but whether a consumer (or a sophisticated consumer) who would use both products would think that they came from the same source. CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Engineering, Inc., 267 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2001)

The 7th Circuit uses a 7-factor test for determining likelihood of confusion: 1) the similarity of the marks in appearance and suggestion, 2) similarity of the products, 3) The area and manner of concurrent use, 4) Degree of care likely to be used by a consumer, 5) strength of plaintiff's mark, 6) evidence of actual confusion, and 7) whether the defendant intended to "palm off" its product as that of the plaintiff. Citing AutoZone, Inc. v. Strick, 543 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2008); In re E.I. DuPont, 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973) The court went on to say that "[t]he rights of an owner of a registered trademark extend to any goods or services that, in the minds of consumers, might be put out by a single producer. Thus, a likelihood of confusion may exist even if the parties are not in direct competition, or their products and services are not identical." Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. at 17 The panel also admitted that it may place more weight on whether the marks are similar or identical because such a question is one of fact. Id. at 19 referencing M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Comm., Inc. 450 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006)

The panel found that the TTAB analysis comported with its own analysis: The marks were identical, the products performed in a similar fashion and that sophisticated consumers would equate the two products as being from the same source.

The appellate panel then proceeded to dismiss Phoenix's counterclaims for trademark infringement based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity which is granted to state entities under the 11th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The only way that state sovereign immunity can be overcome is (1) Congress provides for abrogation pursuant to the 14th amendment, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), or (2) the state affirmatively waives sovereign immunity, see Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883).

The 7th circuit acknowledged that the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA) was held unconstitutional in Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 666 (1999) as to providing state liability for false advertising. The 7th Circuit acknowledged that the SCOTUS's decision as it might be applied to an infringement counterclaim was unclear.

The 7th Circuit equated Phoenix's claims to the TRCA's sister statute, the Patent Remedy Clarification Act (PRCA), which allowed for states to be held liable for patent infringement and had likewise been held unconstitutional. First the panel looked to see if the TRCA was "appropriate" under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment. The 7th circuit found that the TRCA was not congruent and proportional to the unlawful acts it sought to prohibit. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) This had also been the case with the PRCA. The court agreed with UW that Congress had not much evidence of state induced trademark infringement and that any such infringement was not a taking of property without due process because Congress had not considered the availability of state remedies. Bd. of Regents at 29 citing Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) For purposes of the case, the patent version of Florida Prepaid and Board of Regents were basically interchangeable when it came to the abrogation issue.

Next, the court looked to see if UW had waived its sovereign immunity by engaging in a TTAB cancellation proceeding and participating in the federal trademark registration system. In sum, did UW commit a constructive waiver. The answer to this question was a resounding no. More specifically, constructive waiver had been rejected in the Florida Prepaid case. Bd. of Regents at 33 The court also noted that Phoenix's counterclaims were not dependent upon UW's trademark registration and the district court action was really just a continuation of the cancellation proceeding. Id at 33-35

Because there had no valid congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity via Section 5 of the 14th Amendment for trademark infringement counterclaims, and because UW had not waived its immunity, summary judgment for UW on the counterclaims based on sovereign immunity was affirmed.

Circuit Judge Wood concurred with the majority's findings on the likelihood of confusion issue but did not agree that UW could claim protection of sovereign immunity.